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 How should one treat the diversity of bigger ethno-cultural (linguistic, historical and 
so on) communities within a single state? For countries like Croatia it is a crucial ques-
tion. The answers cluster around three general types of intra-state arrangements, to 
which one might add the trans-state, more cosmopolitan proposals (see Picture 1).  
 While classical nationalism proposes that each ethno-cultural community should 
have its own state, owned by the community in question, multiculturalism proposes a 
“multi-nation” state. The third option is the civic, republican one. It has a very respect-
able origin. In the contemporary French as well as in the older Anglo-American litera-
ture the dominant concept of nation was simply the civic, state-oriented one: all citizens 
of a state form a nation. According to the definition offered by Abbe Sieyes, a nation is 
“un corps d’associes viviant sous un loi commune et representé par la meme legisla-
ture”. Of course, it has become clear that “nation” needs more than un loi commune in 
order to function. Still, on the civic view, it is citizenship that is essential for national 
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belonging. Dominique Schnapper has recently proposed a brilliant theorization of this 
concept in her La communauté des citoyennes. She points to the ancestry of this concept 
in Durkheim, Mauss and Aron (1994, Ch. 1). It is often contrasted with the Central-
European, ethnically oriented one, for which a special term, “ethno-nation” has been 
coined: a group forms an ethno-nation if its members share – or, alternatively, believe 
they share – origin, language and culture. This civic concept forms the topic of the 
present paper. Is a purely civic nation a viable alternative to ethnic nationalism? I would 
say probably not, and that we have to go all the way to multiculturalism and the multi-
nation. This is the view to be defended in the essay.  
 
Picture 1: Types of intra-state arrangements between ethnic communities 
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 Now, most nationalists in the contemporary world do not strictly distinguish be-
tween the two concepts. Both at the level of political, unreflective nationalism, and of 
the sophisticated philosophical defense of pro-national attitudes, the dominant concept 
is the mixed one of a cultural group, possibly united by a common descent, endowed 
with some kind of civic ties. Patrice Canivez puts it laconically: “nation, in this sense, is 
a community of culture” (1994: 210, all translations from French are mine). According 
to R. Polin “a l'idee de nation qui se definit par la cohesion politique (...) correspond 
l'idee de nationalité qui releve d'une triple façon de cette realité culturelle” (Polin, 1997: 
71). A great deal of debate concerns whether all such groups should be granted the right 
to a state. They are variously called “nations”, “ethnic groups”, or even, “tribes”. Since 
we want to enter the debate with the nationalist, we have to accept its terms, and stick to 
this vague cultural sense of “nation”. We thus follow the division proposed by the title 
of a paper by Charles Taylor: Nation culturelle, nation politique (Taylor, 2000). Some 
recent commentators explicitly propose an analysis of this mixed concept (see Seymour, 
1998, 1999). We shall be reminding the reader of the ethnic component, by occasionally 
writing the “ethno-cultural nation” in full.  
 Let me summarize. There is a purely political sense of a “nation”, captured by the 
famous definition by Abbé Sieyès, referring to a community as living by the same laws; 
and there is the ethno-cultural sense. The later allows for different nuances, the more 
primitive ones stressing the ethnic origins (“la terre et les morts”, the land and the dead, 
invoked by the French nationalist Maurice Barrès), and the more sophisticated ones 
stressing the cultural element. 
  
 1. The community of citizens 
 Let me now detail the civic model. It rejects any form of (what it considers to be) the 
ethno-cultural nation. It is often associated with France as its alleged cradle and the 
country of its paradigmatic realization. The model brings nation very close to the state 
(and some versions, but not Schnapper's, identify the two), and considers it as Etat-na-
tion. It does allow for a wide range of variations, depending on the degree of integration 
of the ethno-national culture and the state. At one extreme, we find the totally integra-
tionist version, often considered to be the pure state of the model. This identification of 
the ethno-cultural and the politico-national features is also proposed by great French so-
cial thinkers like Marcel Mauss, Emile Durkheim, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre. At 
the opposite extreme one finds a liberal proposal of a culturally completely non-inte-
grated state, which is still strictly neutral among various ethno-cultural groups. It leaves 
the culture of these groups intact, and considers it to be a private matter of their mem-
bers. Some proposals by Kukathas illustrate this opposite extreme.1 A slightly less rigor-
ous form is defended by Brian Barry in his recent Culture and Equality. 
 
1 Here are three typical quotes from his papers: “...liberalism’s counsel is to resist the demand for 
recognition. (...) In a sense, it recommends doing nothing” (1998: 687). “There is no more reason to insist that 
gipsy parents offer their children a ‘rational choice’ of life style through public education than there is to 
require that other parents offer their children the opportunity to become gypsies” (1995: 248). “Liberalism is 
indifferent to the groups of which individuals may be members” (1998: 691). 
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 Between these extremes is a moderate version, exemplified by the work of 
Dominique Schnapper (1991, 1994). She is one of its most sophisticated contemporary 
defenders, perhaps the most sophisticated. She has come to construct her version 
through many years of top quality empirical research focusing on the actual ethno-
cultural diversity of contemporary France. We shall therefore take her proposal as our 
favorite version of the model in order to consider it in its best variation. Schnapper 
remarks that “the very notion of ethnic nation is a contradiction in terms” (1994: 24). In 
other words, there is not much to discuss when it comes to ethno-cultural claims and 
ethno-cultural nationalism. 
 “Nation, as a historical relatum has to be distinguished from nationalism. This term 
designates either the claims of ethnic groups to be recognized as nations (...), or the will 
to power of constituted nations trying to affirm themselves against others” (1994: 36). 
 In a word, there is no real issue of nationalism: nation is a community of citizens, 
and citizenship is an answer to all the worries. Taking her moderate, mellow version as 
our paradigm, we sacrifice purity for quality: the alternative would be to consider the 
republican model in a pure but completely abstract version which is utterly blind to 
cultural heterogeneity and has no chance of being implemented in concreto (and, judged 
by my personal experience as a lecturer, to be accused of criticizing a caricature). How-
ever, we shall be referring to the works of other authors in the neighborhood of the 
model, particularly that of A. Finkielkraut. I apologize for having to be brief. 
 The model is organized around the contrast between the pre-national items, called 
nationalité or ethnie and the nation which is identified with Etat-nation. Schnapper is 
initially very clear and decisive about it. “There is only one idea of nation”, she claims 
(1994: 24). In the Introduction to her book (1991: 15), she quotes the Pope's speech in 
the UNESCO in which he refers to his Poland as a “nation”, and stresses how “it has 
preserved, in spite of the partitions and the foreign occupations, its national sover-
eignty… relying upon its culture”. But even a Pope is fallible when it comes to con-
fronting the model: Schnapper rebukes this Pope for confusing the nation with the eth-
nie: his dear Poland has been, during the occupations and the partitions merely an eth-
nie, not a nation. As already mentioned, the notion of an ethnic nation is considered by 
Schnapper to be a contradiction in terms. The two notions exclude each other. The eth-
nie is a historical community of culture, contrary to a community of citizens. 
 From the sociological point of view, a modern historical nation is a political form 
which has surpassed (transcende) the differences among populations, ... and has inte-
grated them into an entity organized around a common political project. (1991:70). 
 The first key ingredient is the notion of forme politique. It is here that the Pope went 
wrong: in dark times when the community of Poles had no forme politique, their 
community eo ipso failed to be a nation. The Scots are not a nation by the same token. 
But Schnapper corrects the oversimplified pure model: the nation is not identical with 
the state, it is the community integrated into a state. 
 The second key element is rather a metaphor than a pure concept. It concerns the 
idea of surpassing or “transcending” the differences within the would-be nation. “The 
nation is defined by its ambition to surpass (de transcender) by citizenship the particu-
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lar belongings …” (1994: 49). The metaphor is quite wide, and a lot depends on how it 
is made more precise. The model is clear about what “transcender” means at the politi-
cal level. It means abolishing.  
 Political recognition of ethic groups integrated into a nation leads to disintegration 
and impotence (1994: 38).2 
 So, in the political case, the difference transcended loses all its political clout, not 
just part of it. We might infer that in this model, when it comes to politics, transcender 
means to obliterate. The nation-state is a singular entity in a very strong sense, and it is 
the sentiment of political singularity which guarantees “la grandeur de son projet 
politique” (1994: 58). To take a fictional example: if Carpathia really wants to become a 
nation, it should integrate Lavinians to the point of denying them any political 
recognition. 
 The successful transcending ends up by creating strong sentimental bonds and the 
corresponding “social habitus”. Schnapper appeals to these bonds to justify a pro-na-
tional attitude.3 “Let us retain from this passage the idea that the identity-related habitus 
and emotions are morally prior to objective integration. (The idea is very important for 
Schnapper and plays the key role in the final chapter of her book on integration (see 
1991: 357-363 for a very forceful statement). Without it, the model loses its grip once it 
is conceded that the objective integration of a state into another political structure, say 
France into European Union, has become a reality. 
 Let me finally mention a somewhat curious feature of Schnapper's proposal. It af-
firms an exceptional character of France as the paradigm of the model. Such a stance 
points to significant limitations of the model, as we shall presently see. 
 Shnapper's work is sometimes interpreted as implying “a universalism inherent to 
the national political form (Balibar, 2001:97).4 If I understand Balibar correctly, he 
wants to stress the link between the original ideal of the nation put forward by the 
French revolution and the idea of universal human rights. By identifying “societé”, “pe-
uple” and “nation”, these efforts “debouchent sur l'idee que, potentiellement au moins, 
'tout homme est citoyen'“ (2001:103). I must admit that I do not completely understand 
this train of thought. If one identifies societé, peuple and nation, and believes that each 
human being is a member of society, one might end up with the idea that every human 
 
2 This claim is balanced, in the text which immediately follows, by a warning against the opposite danger: 
“l’Etat, lorsqu’il devien trop puissant…absorbe la nation et detruit la communauté des citoyens.” 
3 In order to remain as close to the terminology of the model, in this chapter I will mercifully avoid the 
term “nationalist” (Schnapper reserves it for very specific forms of what is usually called nationalism), and 
talk about the pro-national. 
4 “L’integration objective des hommes…est aujourdhui sans doute modial, mais l’habitus social et les 
emotions identitaires et emotionelles (sic!) ne sont-ils pas, eux, restes etroitement lies a l’appartenance 
nationale?” (1994: 183). Compare the comments by P. Allies who speaks of nationalist left proposing a 
“return to republic”. For them, he writes, “la nation est une construction identitatire qui, dans certains cas, 
peut s’universaliser et depasser les particularismes” (2000:128). He cites R. Debray, M. Gallo, B. Kriegel, M. 
Ozouf, J. Julliard, A. LePors, O. Mongin and P. Thibaud and their republican manifesto published by Le 
Monde on 4th September 1998. Balibar mentions the manifesto in a similar context (2001:95). 
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being is a citizen of one nation or another, which is a very weak form of universalism, 
and exactly the opposite of the strong universalist idea that there is one, world-wide po-
litical community, of which every human being is a citizen. But let me grant him the 
train of thought. He then goes on to show, correctly, that the idea mentioned would then 
make one expect “that the construction of modern nation-states would simply corre-
spond to the tendency to abolish the loss of citizenship” (2001:103). He notes then that 
the expectation is not fulfilled. I agree that it is not, but his deeper diagnosis differs 
from the one I propose. He explains the failure of the abolitionist project by a “perverse 
effect of abstract universalism” (2001:104) which can be summarized in the following 
racist or bigoted nationalist’s sophism: If the nation is universal for human beings, and 
some beings are excluded from it, then the excluded ones are not human beings. I doubt 
that this is the actual reasoning of the typical bigoted nationalist or racist since both 
characters have no reason whatsoever to genuinely accept the antecedent, i.e. that every 
human being should be an equal citizen of a nation (take any classical anti-Semitic 
writer, French or German, and try to find anything remotely resembling the antecedent). 
But even assuming charitably that Balibar's reconstruction is accurate, I fail to see how 
this is an “effect of universality”, rather than an expression of anti-universalism, 
disguised by a few universalistic-sounding phrases.5 But let me return to Schnapper, the 
would-be universalist proponent of the idea of a civic nation. 
 
5 Let me note that I find the employed strategy to be an instance of a much more general pattern of how 
well-meaning intellectuals come to reject some rather obviously positive qualities like universality. Take any 
traditionally and commonly highly valued quality Q (for instance rationality and objectivity in research, high 
aesthetic value in art /being part of an ideal canon/, universality in morals and politics). Consider the biased, 
partisan thinker, call him discriminator, who appeals to one of the highly valued qualities in order to 
rationalize the discrimination of some group G. He will typically serve you a piece of reasoning of the 
following sort: 
Q is highly valuable. 
G does not have Q (e.g. Blacks are not beings to whom universalism should apply. Women writers cannot 
write prose of a high aesthetic value or “canonical” prose. Non-whites are not rational.) therefore  
G is to be discriminated against. 
Alternatively, the discriminator might appeal to Q as warranting discrimination indirectly. Let Q be 
objectivity. Then he can propose  
A research possessing Q has shown that Gs are inferior (e. g. “Objective psychological research shows 
that women, Blacks, Jews etc. are inferior”).  
3. follows. 
We want to reject conclusion 3. The obvious way would be to attack 2 and 4, and show that they are false. 
But some well-meaning philosophers or theoreticians in general do not have will nor time to do empirical 
research, or go into the details of women’s writing so they need a shortcut, which is conceptual and “deep”, 
not merely empirical. So, they attack 1. It is not that G does not have Q, it is that Q is not worth having. 
Objectivity is a fraud, literary canon is to be deconstructed, universality is perverse. Q should be re-evaluated. 
We need an Umwertung (and then one can quote Nietzsche and enjoy other familiar philosophical 
conveniences). 
Now, it seems to me pretty obvious that it is 2 and 4 that constitute the real crux of the matter. The 
discriminator is just appealing to a good thing, Q, and lying about G having or satisfying Q. This move of his 
(embodied in 2 and 4) should be criticized, and not the premise 1, which is completely innocent. One might 
call the pattern the Umwertung’s Mistake, since it well-intentionally suggests to “transvaluate” – in fact 
devalue – Q, thereby committing a mistake in reasoning. 
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 If the above interpretation of her work is the proper one, she comes close to those 
writers who see national culture as universal in itself. Let me illustrate how the assump-
tion works in the actual cultural debate with a short quotation of Finkielkraut’s work. 
He has been denouncing what he sees as the twin dangers of the ethnic identity culture 
and of the superficial cosmopolitanism. With an attitude that clearly belongs to the tra-
dition of civic republicanism, he ironises the identity culture summarizing it with a fine 
quip: “Where I was, the We has to come” (“La ou etait le ‘Je’, il ‘Nous’ faut advenir”). 
In his criticism of the UNESCO document on multiculturalism which claims that the 
cultural identity is the very core of the personal identity, he condemns the view that “le 
but de l’education n’est pas de donner a chacun les moyens de faire le tri dans l’enorme 
masse de croyances, d’opinions, de routines et d’idées reçues qui composent son heri-
tage, mais bien au contraire de l’immerger dans cet ocean (de l'identite – NM), da l’y 
plonger la tete la premiere.” (1987: 113). But he also criticises the cosmopolitan 
“planete de la promiscuite” (in the Chapter on the rejection of cosmopolitanism). What 
then is the solution? Where do we find the place that avoids the twin dangers? Criticiz-
ing the identity politics, he claims that the “national culture” is a remedy against both 
dangers of identity glorification and superficial cosmopolitanism. Here is the passage 
from the identity culture to the national culture. First he criticizes what he sees as the 
identity bound project: 
 “La culture devient donc une pure et simple affaire d'identité et l'ecole une affaire de 
communication, de negociation et de dialogue, au detriment de la conception de la cul-
ture dont la nation a eté tres longemps le vehicule. C'est precisement parce que nous 
sommes en train de changer de paradigme (...) que nous avons perdu cette conception 
initiale de la culture, cette conception inherente a la nation...” (Finkielkraut, 1999: 484). 
 In his view, the concept of culture inherent to the nation is a “national culture” 
which is not identity-based.  
 
 2. Discussing the civic model 
 Before examining the model more closely, let me warn the reader. Given the stan-
dard terminology, which brings together cultural belonging and state organization, it is 
difficult even properly to present the alternatives to be compared. Even sophisticated 
authors tend to use the term “nation” ambiguously for the “majority nation”, i.e. the 
people, or a group or a community that happens to be a majority within a state, and for 
the state itself. At the same time they use the adjective “ethnic” either neutrally for 
small groups, dominant minority groups, or pejoratively, as in “barbarie des pouvoirs 
ethniques” (Rupnik, 1995: 77). Then they contrast the “ethnic identity” (which is nega-
tive, or at least second-rank) with the “national identity” which is considered to be “eth-
nically” neutral, somehow civic and universalist. But then the other meaning of “na-
tion”, i.e. “majority group in its state” intrudes and creates confusion. 
 Here is a bunch of problems for the model. Remember how Schnapper claims that 
“the very notion of an ethnic nation is a contradiction in terms”? Nation is just a civic 
nation: “there is just one idea of nation” (1994: 24). Let me then briefly reply to 
Schnapper's claim by using her own conceptual tools. In the chapter on defining nation, 
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she admits that the term “nationalism” denotes “cultural demands of ethnic groups to be 
recognized as a nation” (p. 36, italics mine). It would then seem natural for the re-
searcher of nationalism to use the notion of an ethnic nation. Moreover, she explicitly 
denies any ambition to impose definitions (“Il ne s'agit pas de prendre parti entre les in-
nombrables definitions”) of a nation (p. 27), and predicts that her own definitions will 
be only justified a posteriori, if at all (p. 28). For her, “concepts are instruments of un-
derstanding, not concrete realities “ (Ibid.). Now, I fail to see how she can embrace this 
“nominalist notion” of concepts (as she explicitly calls is) and at the same time claim 
that “there is just one idea (concept) of the nation”. On the contrary, a conceptual nomi-
nalist and instrumentalist (as she declares herself to be) should admit that the civic-na-
tion concept is better for some purposes and the ethnic-and-cultural-nation concept for 
others, and she herself defines nationalism so that the ethnic- and cultural-nation con-
cept seems exactly the right one to use when discussing nationalism. All in all, the claim 
that it is the only correct idea (concept) of the nation, implying an extreme conceptual-
methodological monism, is surprising. It suggests that anyone disagreeing with Schnap-
per have their concepts wrong (e.g. Lefort, who stipulates that “peuple ... est un concept 
politique, tandis que nation est un concept pre-politique” (2000: 40), or Kende, who 
claims that the idea of the nation as a politically integrated cultural community which 
Schnapper ties to the French tradition is “la forme centre-est europeenne de la nation 
politique” (1991: 26). But social items are flexible, and ideas or concepts even more 
than their referents. There is less consensus in the social sciences than in the natural sci-
ences, and even in natural sciences the pluralism of key concepts is normally recognized 
(e.g. in biology the concept of “species” is a hotly contested one, and some varieties are 
agreed to be more appropriate for cladistics, others for population biology, yet others for 
genetics). 
 The next issue is what are the morally legitimate means of nation-building, of “tran-
scendence”? How does a group commence the long march to nationhood? There seems 
to be no way to do it legitimately. To quote an example: Finikielkraut has been justify-
ing the secession of Croatia partly on the basis of the assumption that Croats are a na-
tion. Now, the model demands a nation to have a state, and Croats had none at the mo-
ment, in the year 1991. But Finkielkraut proceeded to argue this assumption by appeal-
ing to historical facts: Croatia was a (decently) independent state in the tenth century. I 
find it quite amusing that a fact about the political organization of a thousand years ago 
should have any bearing on the legitimacy of obtaining and having a state at present. 
(Especially given the fact that in the circumstances having one's own state was the only 
protection the Croatian citizens had against the very serious threat from Milošević.) 
Suppose it turned out that the Croatian historical documents had been falsified, and that 
the alleged kings at the close of the first millennium were really vassals to the Franks? 
Would that change anything regarding the right of the Croats living at the end of the 
second millennium? But given the model, Finkielkraut's strategy was a wise one, since 
the model seems to rely on the assumption that in order to be legitimately a nation you 
should have been one already. 
 Here is a related problem. Remember the moral priority of sentimental bonds and 
social habitus over the objective integration in Schnapper's model. It raises an awkward 
issue of ever legitimizing the state integration. At some given point in time, members of 
a given etnie had a much stronger bond to their own etnie than to some newly founded 
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state on their territory (for example Bretons, Provencales, in relation to the French 
state). According to the model, their bond ranks morally higher than the objective po-
litical integration. So any attempt to break the bond, even with a minimum force, is ille-
gitimate. And conversely, if the adherents of the model accept that the objective inte-
gration may legitimately (in moral, juridical and political sense) trump the sentimental 
bond plus social habitus, then she or he must also accept that the European integration 
might legitimately trump the identity focused emotions. 
 Third, Schnapper proudly stresses that France is exceptionally integrated. But it 
seems that even France has problem with the model. Schnapper goes to considerable 
lengths (1991, Chapter nine in particular) to study influences that threaten the model’s 
survival in France. Other authors concur.6 So it is natural to be interested in the question 
of how far the model can be generalized. Schnapper is not helpful at this point, since she 
is enthusiastic about the “singularity of the French nation” (the title of the concluding 
chapter of her book, (1991), and its exceptional character. Taken literally, these formu-
lations bode ill for the would-be generalisers: if France is singular and thereby excep-
tional in exemplifying the model, then generalizing the model beyond its frontiers 
makes little sense. I am leaving it open, and a matter for French experts to debate, to 
what extent is Schnapper's description correct for France itself. But other authors sug-
gest that France may have similar problems like other countries.7 But if we leave the 
French scene, the main issue is how to apply the model to the countries that are not as 
integrated as France, i.e. the majority of countries in the world.  
 Interestingly, the model might be nowadays most relevant for those rare multi-ethnic 
(multi-tribal) countries in which there is no clear majority ethnic group and several 
groups are competing for leadership (Africa might offer examples, but I would prefer to 
leave the particulars to specialists). In such heterogeneous surroundings, the imposition 
of a single common civic structure, together with some of its cultural concomitants 
(language) might be the right move. However, a large number of present day countries 
exhibit a different structure: a large majority culture, plus one or more significant mi-
norities. To stay for a moment within the francophone area, and check whether the 
model could be used closer to home, culturally speaking, take the example of Quebec 
and of Canada. The options, in abstracto, are the following: either the country is not a 
 
6 “La crise de l’Etat-nation en Europe, et en France, du modele ‘jacobin’ ne peut manquer de susciter un 
interet pour l’histoire constitutionelle americaine” (Raynaud, 1995: 88). 
7 For instance a study by Pascal Perrineau. He criticizes the expression “l’ere du vide” for the description 
of the eighties in France; to use it means to ignore precisely the identity issues: “C’est ignorer que ce ‘vide 
social’ a eté occupé par une serie des mouvements identitaires, que l’identité revendique soit religieuse, 
ethnique ou nationale. Dans les anées quatre-vingt, se developpe tout un tissu d’associations sur une base 
communautaire dnas les milieuyx de l’immigration. Particulierement touchée par les processus de 
marginalization sociale, l’immigation reagit et met en place des reseaux de solidarité sociale. Ecartelees entre 
la voie de l’integration et celle de l’affirmation communautaire, l’immigration et sa descendance entrent en 
conflit avec le modele français traditionel de l’integration individuelle. Face a cela se developpent des 
reactions tout aussi identitaires ou, sur fond de crise economique et de mutation urbaine, des citoyens français 
vivent le sentiment que leur pays, leur region ou leur quartier sont envahis. La voie est libere pour que 
s’epanouisse un nationalisme français, populiste et xenophobe” (1993:250). 
For interesting points along similar lines see also Joel Roman (1995). 
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nation at all, or it is a nation, or it is something in-between, say a half-baked nation on 
the way to become a full-blown one. If it is not a nation, then presumably Quebec and 
the Anglophone part are each a nation, and they should automatically part company. (If 
neither part is even remotely a nation, as well as the whole, then the model leaves us 
completely in the dark about what should be done). If Canada as a whole is a nation, 
then it is the nation of the majority, i.e. an Anglophone nation. Then the prohibition of 
political recognition of ethnies applies to the Quebecois. None of the two seems re-
motely plausible. The remaining option is that Canada is a half-baked nation, on its way 
to become one. But then the recipe of the republican model would be to integrate the 
Quebecois, by all means available to a strong government. The Quebec example should 
help us locate the critical weak spot of the model. To start at the relatively superficial 
level, in most countries of the world, the majority culture is not the only one, and in 
many it is not the only autochthonous one (for what autochthony is worth). Now, the 
majority may try to integrate everyone “autour d'un projet politique”, but it would be its 
project, not the minorities’. How does the majority then integrate minorities into its po-
litical project without granting them political recognition? What means of “transcender” 
should be employed, and are there democratic means at all that will on the average tend 
to achieve the result?  
 A simpler, deeper, and more general point is then that the majority culture is not a 
neutral culture. Although it appears neutral in a perfectly integrated Etat-nation, in any 
country which is less then perfectly integrated, it remains recognizably bound to the 
majority. Similar criticism has been raised in contemporary literature, most vociferously 
from Canada. A cautious and a thoughtful version has been recently offered to the 
French readers by Dieckoff, in the second part of his book (2000). Balibar notes, along 
similar lines, “deep antinomies” hidden in the model (2001:100).8 The most elaborated 
criticisms are those of Kymlicka (1989 and 2001). Let me illustrate the point by using 
first a fictional example, and then a real-life illustration, moving away from Schnapper’s 
work to consider some related writings of Finkielkraut. First, the fiction. Lavinians are 
the majority in Lavinia, Carpathians a minority. In the state-sense of the nation, call it 
the “state-nation”, a Carpathian citizen of Lavinia is of Lavinian state-nationality (i.e. 
citizenship). In the other sense, i.e. of belonging to a minority group, call it the group-
nationality, he/she is of Carpathian nationality (i.e. group-nationality), whereas his/her 
majority co-citizen is of the Lavinian group-nationality. Now, culture generally seems 
to go with the group-nationality and not the state-nationality. And the group-nationality 
is not culturally neutral while the state-nationality might be. The confusion arises 
because the model identifies majority’s group-nationality with state-nationality, and 
describes the minority group-nationality as not being national at all, but “ethnic”. 
Suddenly, the very culturally immersed majority Lavinian starts to look like a paragon 
of neutrality and universality, whereas his/her poor Carpathian neighbor is relegated to 
ethnic barbarity, exactly for the same kind of attitude for which his neighbor is praised. 
The very French attitudes of Frenchmen are then implicitly portrayed as embodying 
neutrality and universality, while those very Corsican of Corsicans are depicted as 
“ethnic”, potentially or actually “barbaric” sentiments. 
 
8 Compare the notion of “culture nationale-etatiste” developed by M. Kail in his book (2000). 
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 Let me now very briefly turn to Finkielkraut’s remark concerning the concept of cul-
ture which has been for a long time carried by nation. He regrets that “we have lost this 
initial concept of culture, one inherent to the nation”. In his view, the concept of culture 
inherent to the nation is a universalist “national culture” which is not identity-based. But 
what is the difference between la culture identitaire and la culture nationale? In con-
trast to Schnapper, Finkielkraut is in no position to answer that he is talking about some 
specific nation that is allegedly exceptional for its absence of cultural nationalism. He is 
very much concerned about small nations, which he justly sees as having a morally 
equal standing as the big, historical ones. So, what would he propose to his dear Czechs, 
Croats and Slovaks? If he asks them to focus upon their national culture(s), he will be 
peddling the same identity-based goods he condemns so decisively. In all these coun-
tries, national culture is the culture of the ethno-nation, period. More importantly, na-
tional cultures are particular, not universal and Finkielkraut seems to be aware of this: 
he praises Montaigne for preferring humankind to his fatherland, but above all he 
praises Renan for saying that “there is a human culture, before the French, German and 
Italian one” (1987: 51). This implies that in Finkielkraut’s own view there is a differ-
ence, and the nationally neutral culture humaine is not the same as the national culture, 
and is prior to it.  
 On the other hand, if he proposes to the peoples of the earth to get rid of the culture 
focused on identity, he will have to propose a universalist view of culture, maybe 
slanted a bit towards local sources, but in its essence non-local and not entrenched. He 
would then come to cosmopolitanism, only under a different name (“universe” replacing 
“cosmos”). We can glean his preferred solution from the passage quoted above: the aim 
of the education should be “donner a chacun les moyens de faire le tri dans l’enorme 
masse de croyances, d’opinions, de routines et d’idées reçues qui composent son heri-
tage”. But what is national about this way out? He claims that the “nation” “has for a 
long time been a vehicle” for such a culture. But mere teaching does not make the na-
tion a vehicle of things taught, nor does it make the universalist culture national. (A lot 
of mathematics has been taught in the same schools, but does this make nation a vehicle 
of mathematics?) On the other hand, recognizably national cultures have been based on 
national cultural identities. My conclusion is that his way out is not really one. There is 
no culture that is at the same time neutral and national. Polin is right when he claims 
that a “nation stems from a slow elaboration of a culture of a very particular type” 
(1997: 70) and when he implies that the result embodies the culture of the origin. 
 I am very much aware that neither my very brief account of the model, nor my criti-
cism could do full justice to the subtlety and intelligence of its proponents and defend-
ers. Still, let me summarize: the civic republican model is faced with a profound diffi-
culty if it is to be generalized and applied to typical contemporary countries. Either it 
poses as culturally neutral without actually being such (as in Finkielkraut's example), 
and the pose is then quickly unmasked. Or, it manifestly takes a cultural stance and pro-
poses a cultural integration into the majority culture (as in Schnapper's work). In that 
case, minorities seem to have a moral right to say no, and it is probable that this right 
will be sooner or later exercised. As Dieckoff has put it “the state itself does not escape 
into culture” (p.71). In practice the alleged “purely civic” states are characterized by a 
particular culture, the culture of the majority group. To see the tension this creates in the 
model, compare the following two quotations from Schnapper taken from the same 
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page. She offers the following normative principle: “The action of a nation-state con-
sists in introducing and strengthening national singularities, thanks to which the com-
munity of citizens, an abstract notion, becomes a concrete reality, situated in time and 
space, capable of mobilizing populations” (Schnapper, 1994: 24). And she makes it then 
more concrete: “It is the effort of the emancipation from the identities and belonging 
experienced as natural, by means of abstracting citizenship which properly characterizes 
the national project” (Schnapper, 1994: 24). But there is a tension between the two. The 
first claim portrays a nation as a concrete reality potentially mobilizing people, the sec-
ond as an “abstraction of citizenship”, opposed to “belonging experienced as natural”. 
The two seem to clash. In certain situations, the clash is resolved by the state through 
privileging one culture and one belonging experienced as natural, namely the majori-
tarian one. Minorities are suppressed as being too dangerous for the stability of the na-
tion-state. But the model has little to offer in the direction of justifying the majority rule 
in the case of conflict. Especially in the contemporary Western countries, which are, by 
the adherents' own admission, objectively integrated into larger, trans-national units, the 
mere sentimental attachment of the majority to its cultural identity gives it no right to 
trample on the corresponding attachment of minorities. In conflicts it is just sentiment 
against sentiment, given that the objective integration is anyway pointing in a quite dif-
ferent direction. Maybe the wisest way then is to let the champions of the model go on 
admiring the uniqueness and singularity of its unique representative, and remain at that. 
The issue of nationalism is still a burning one, in spite of their optimism. 
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